Chapter Three

In 1775 the four New England colonies had raised their own armies in the aftermath of Lexington, and New York followed suit with encouragement from the Continental Congress. Lack of centralized direction allowed each colony to base its regimental organization on its own particular experience in the earlier Imperial Wars. Congress accepted responsibility for the troops in June when it established the Continental Army. The enlistments of most of the soldiers composing the field armies besieging the British strongholds of Boston and Quebec expired on the last day of December. Congress, George Washington, and his senior officers used the reenlistment of those troops as a vehicle for transforming the Continental Army into a unified national force. In the process they emphasized lessons derived from the French and Indian War.

In his first week at Boston in 1775 George Washington had identified several organizational problems, and his earliest letters to Congress suggested solutions. During the summer individual delegates visited the Main Army, and in the fall a special congressional committee held extensive discussions with the military leaders and with representatives of the New England governments. Based on that committee's report and Washington's recommendations, a number of major reforms were introduced for 1776.

Washington's first concern was the weakness of so many of the Massachusetts regiments. Calling out militia to supplement the Main Army did not appear to be a viable policy. The generals unanimously agreed "that no Dependence can be put on the Militia for a continuance in Camp, or Regularity and Discipline during the short time they may stay."¹ Washington attempted to fill the strength deficiencies locally, but he privately doubted that he would succeed, and as early as 10 July he suggested to Congress that it recruit in areas outside New England. In time Washington decided that some incompetent officers also were undermining the quality of his army. He blamed this problem on defects in the methods of selecting officers used by Massachusetts and urged Congress to retain sole control over commissions. This policy would have the additional advantage of broadening the geographical base of the officer corps. In addition, he complained that the differences in the New England regimental organizations hampered efficient operations.²

1. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 3:327.
2. Ibid., pp. 320-31, 390-400, 433, 450-54, 456-57, 505-13. On 10 July, the date Washington submitted his first report to Congress, he began a policy of sending personal letters to individual members of Congress. He used these letters to express opinions which would have been impolitic in official dispatches and to solicit the recipients to act as his agents in securing legislation he desired.

During Congress' August recess several members traveled to Massachusetts for a personal view of Washington's army. After Congress reconvened, the delegates decided that to begin a reorganization now would only cause needless discord since enlistments would expire before any changes could become effective. Promising to make improvements in the future, they requested Washington to send specific proposals. On 29 September Congress established a special committee to confer with Washington, his senior advisers, and officials of the New England governments. None of the committee members (Thomas Lynch, Benjamin Harrison, and Benjamin Franklin) came from New England, but all favored a vigorous military effort. This fact-finding committee arrived at headquarters on 15 October with instructions to persuade the Connecticut troops to remain until 31 December rather than 10 December as their enlistments specified. They also conveyed a message that Congress hoped that Washington could attack Boston before the end of the year. The committee's basic task, however, was to prepare a report for Congress on specific measures needed to reorganize the Continental Army, including Schuyler's army, for an additional year's service. Committee members were instructed to discuss the projected total cost, the rates of pay and the size of the ration, the need for additional regulations, and the implementation of a uniform regimental organization; they were also to recommend a plan for raising troops that would provide for the retention of as many veteran officers and men as possible.³

Washington prepared for these meetings by collecting written opinions from his generals and the heads of the staff departments; he also held a Council of War on 8 October. The consensus reached at this meeting reflected Washington's personal views. The officers wanted the new Main Army to consist of at least 20,000 men organized in 26 standard infantry regiments and separate units of riflemen and artillery. Each regiment was to be reduced from ten to eight companies. Each company was to have a captain, 2 lieutenants, an ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, a fifer, a drummer, and 76 privates. Each regiment would then have a total strength of 728 officers and men. Eight companies lent themselves to better tactical deployment than ten companies in linear warfare. The new organizations would have stronger companies than those of most of the existing regiments and would save money. The generals avoided the question of how to select the officers because of its "delicacy."⁴

These findings and the written staff reports formed the basis for frank discussions with the congressional committee and New England civil leaders from 18 to 24 October. The committee promised Washington that his Main Army would be reinforced before it was made responsible for the defense of New York City, and the committee (exceeding its authority) allowed him to begin reenlisting his men, for a year ending on 31 December 1776. Congress began debating the committee's report on 2 November and completed the reorganization in a month. It was clearly impressed by the unanimity reported by the committee, and it approved the recommendations of

3. JCC, 3:265-67, 270-72; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2:26-27, 64-65, 79-86, 112-13. For a general discussion of Congress' role in the 1776 reorganization, see the following: Burnett, The Continental Congress, pp. 101-8; Donald John Proctor, "From Insurrection to Independence: The Continental Congress and the Military Launching of the American Revolution" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1965), pp. 141-43, 151-83.
4. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:7-13; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:1039-44. Other topics discussed included pay, rations, terms of enlistment, regulations, and enlistment of Negroes.

Washington and the other military leaders with little change. The committee thus served as the vehicle for transmitting the Main Army's ideas to Congress.⁵

On 4 November Congress approved the reorganization of the infantry into 26 regiments, each with the structure recommended by the generals. (Chart 2) It also accepted their plan for implementing the reorganization.⁶ Congress ordered that uniforms were to include brown coats with different colored facings (collar, lapels, cuffs, and inside lining of the coattails) to distinguish the regiments, a system borrowed from the red-coated British Army. Each regiment contained 3 field officers (who could not be generals or captains), a small staff, and 8 companies. Each company had 4 officers and 2 musicians, plus 8 noncommissioned officers and 76 privates evenly divided into 4 squads.⁷ At full strength the regiment deployed 640 privates and corporals—the soldiers who stood in the ranks with muskets—or 88 percent of its total of 728. The 32 officers and 32 sergeants provided a favorable ratio of one supervisor to ten rank and file for maintaining company-level control.

A comparison of this Continental regiment with its British counterpart reveals

5. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 1155-67; Smith. Letters of Delegates, 2:233-38 243-44. 298 337-38; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:22-23, 45-47, JCC, 3:313-14, 318.
6. JCC, 3:321-25, 399. Compared to the regimental structure established in October for units from Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the new structure added a lieutenant, a lifer, a drummer, and eight privates to each company: ibid., pp. 285-86, 291.
7. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:213-14.

some basic philosophical differences and sheds light on their relative strengths and weaknesses, although it must be remembered that both sides habitually operated with units well below full strength. The basic single-battalion British infantry regiment (Chart 3) was far less formidable than the Continental regiment despite an aggregate strength of 809. It also had three field officers on its rolls, but the colonel was a titular officer, the lieutenant colonel often served as a brigadier, and he or the major were frequently detailed to special duties. Staff organization was identical to that of the Continental regiment, but British chaplains and medical personnel were absent to a greater extent. Each British regiment had 12 companies, but 2 were recruiting depots (one each in England and Ireland). Two were "flank" companies: the grenadier company, composed of the largest men, served as the heavy strike force on the right (honor) flank of the regiment, while the light infantry, selected for agility, held the left flank or served as skirmishers. By the era of the Revolution, however, the British normally detached the flank companies from their regiments and formed provisional grenadier and light infantry battalions from them. This practice deprived a regiment of its best men; in addition, the remaining line, or "battalion companies," had to supply replacements to the flank companies.⁸

The British companies all had the same basic organization: 3 officers, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 drummers (actually a fifer and drummer), and 56 privates. Both flank companies had two lieutenants rather than a lieutenant and an ensign. Three of the line companies lacked a captain since the field officers commanding them nominally

8. Headquarters Papers of the British Army in America, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, nos. 27-29 (Sec at War Barrington to Gage, 31 Aug 75, with enclosure); 206 (Barrington, Circular to Colonels, 26 Aug 75); 288 (Barrington to Howe, 10 Jun and 18 Oct 76); 660 (See of State Germain to Howe, 1 Sep 77): 3181-82 (Sec at War Jenkinson to Clinton, 5 Dec 80); 3343 (Clinton, General Orders, 26 Oct 80); Edward E. Curtis, Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), pp. 1-4, 23-24; Eric Robson, "The Raising of a Regiment in the War of American Independence," Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 27 (1949):107-15.

were also captains. The grenadier company had two additional fifers, slots used for the regimental fife and drum majors. Three of the privates in every company were "contingent men," fictitious names carried on the regiment's rolls. Their pay was used as a special regimental fund for the care of widows and orphans. These exceptions plus normal detachments and details greatly reduced the fighting strength of the regiment. A British lieutenant colonel could deploy a maximum of only 514 men, 63 percent of the theoretical total; only 448 were musketmen. Such full-strength figures, moreover, were rarely seen during the Revolution.

Although a common heritage produced many apparent similarities in the eight-company battle formations of the Continental and British battalions, Washington planned to make his much more powerful. The American battalion contained nearly 50 percent more musketmen (640 to 448) without sacrificing any control. The British had a similar theoretical ratio of roughly one supervisor (21 company officers and 24 sergeants) for every ten fighters, but Washington normally enjoyed a higher ratio of officers to men than his opponents because so many British officers were absent.⁹ Shortages of enlisted men plagued both armies, but the additional problems of transatlantic communications made the procurement of replacements particularly troublesome for the British.¹⁰

The differences in British and American regimental organizations reflected deliberate doctrinal differences. Britain, influenced by Frederick the Great and its own experience in the Seven Years' War, produced a regiment tailored to formal European battle. It deployed its battalion companies in three ranks to achieve the density needed for a bayonet charge.¹¹ The Continentals turned instead to their colonial tradition of aimed fire and to the lessons of the French and Indian War for inspiration. They adopted a formation using only two ranks, with a frontage more than twice the size of that of a British battalion (320 men to 150). In the American volley all 640 shots counted. The fire of a third rank was so ineffective that a British volley only hoped for 300 shots.

The regimental staff expanded during 1776. Original plans assumed that it would consist of a chaplain, a surgeon, and a surgeon's mate, with the functions of adjutant and quartermaster being additional duties for subalterns. Congress formally approved the surgeon's position on 8 December 1775 and the mate's on 30 March 1776. The hospital staff screened all candidates since Washington considered it "a matter of too much importance, to intrust the Wounds and Lives of Officers, and Soldiers, to unskilled Surgeons."¹² At Washington's request Congress added five specialists on 16 July.

9. British Headquarters Papers, nos. 371 (Germain to Howe, 14 Jan 77); 411 (Barrington to Howe, 24 Feb 77); 552 (Howe to Barrington, 1 Jun 77).
10. Ibid., nos. 496, 530, 660 (Germain to Howe, 19 Apr. 18 May, and 3 Sep 77); 1031 (Germain to Clinton, 21 Mar 78); 2993, 3181 (Jenkinson to Clinton, 5 Sep 80 and 5 Dec 81).
11. Ibid., no. 1999 (Clinton to Germain, 14 May 79); Glover, Peninsular Preparation; pp. 112-22; J. F. C. Fuller, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1925), pp. 79-92 124-57, 193; Sir William Howe, General Sir William Howe's Orderly Book at Charlestown, Boston, and Halifax. 17 June 1775, to 26 May 1776, ed. Benjamin Franklin Stevens (1890; reprint ed., Port Washing. ton, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1970), pp. 132, 145-46, 294. By 1778 the British shifted to two ranks to compensate for endemic shortages and a lack of firepower: William B. Willcox, ed., The American Rebellion: Sir Henry Clinton's Narrative of His Campaigns. 1775-1782 With an Appendix of Original Documents (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 95n.
12. Fitzpatrick, 4:345.

The drum and fife majors supervised musicians; the sergeant major assumed administrative responsibilities as the adjutant's enlisted assistant; and the quartermaster sergeant became the quartermaster's helper. The creation of these four enlisted positions merely formalized de facto specialties. A paymaster relieved the combat officers of financial bookkeeping.¹³

Washington wished to attract more capable chaplains by improving their status. He recommended raising salaries and assigning each chaplain to minister to two regiments, and Congress approved. When this arrangement proved unmanageable during the course of the year, Congress authorized a chaplain for each regiment. The deteriorating battlefield situation, however, limited actual appointments. The chaplains' duties remained the same throughout the war: providing moral, spiritual, and political guidance, plus assisting the surgeon. The chaplains corps was notable for its freedom from denominational friction. A Roman Catholic priest, for example, became an Army chaplain; this appointment would have been unthinkable in 1774.¹⁴

While Congress dealt with the new regimental organization and related matters, Washington began the reorganization of the Main Army. Acting on preliminary instructions from the congressional committee, he surveyed his officers to find out how many planned to remain in service. By 1 November Adjutant General Gates had compiled preliminary statistics. (Table 2) The overall response was encouraging: 751 of the authorized 1,465 officers intended to stay. Among 1,286 combat officers, 641 (78 field grade and 563 company grade) made positive responses. Twenty-six regiments required 78 field officers and 832 company officers. Thus only minor adjustments were necessary to account for a full complement of field officers. Massachusetts had an excess of candidates, while the other colonies had some shortages. In terms of company officers, the creation of a second lieutenant position caused some problems since most colonies had not had this rank in 1775. At the same time, there was a surplus of captains.¹⁵

Washington and his generals selected the field officers on 2 November. Because a more detailed evaluation was required to choose the remaining officers, those selections were delegated to groups composed of the brigadier general and field officers of each brigade. Washington retained the right to review all arrangements. To make up the shortages in the company-officer ranks, he instructed the groups to consider officers who had originally indicated that they would not remain but who had since changed their minds, officers who had been absent from camp at the time of the survey, and qualified sergeants. Washington reluctantly abandoned his desire to mingle officers from all colonies in each regiment when the idea proved extremely unpopular. The arrangements were gradually completed, and the officers began reenlisting men on 13 November. Recruiting parties, promises of liberal furloughs, and elimination of arrears in pay all were employed in an unsuccessful effort to fill the regiments before 1 January.¹⁶

13. Ibid., 5:238, 337, 410, 441; JCC, 3:416; 4:242-43; 5:418, 479, 563; 6:862; 8:426-27.
14. JCC, 4:61; 5:522; 6:891; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:197-98, 205, 307-8; 5:192-93 244-45; Williams, "Soldiers of God," pp. 69, 95-101, 111-33.
15. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:36-37, 43-45, 58-59, 145-47; the returns are in RG 93, National Archives. The riflemen were not included in the statistics since their service did not expire until 1 July 1776.
16. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:73, 77, 81-88, 94-96, 99-103, 108-11, 116, 120-23, 145-49, 153-54; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2:96; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:1333-34.

Washington implemented the reorganization of the Main Army on 1 January 1776. General Orders announced:

This day giving commencement to the new army, which, in every point of View is entirely Continental, . . . His Excellency hopes that the Importance of the great Cause we are engaged in, will be deeply impressed upon every Man's mind, and wishes it to be considered, that an Army without Order, Regularity and Discipline, is no better than a Commission'd Mob.¹⁷

Each infantry regiment was assigned a numerical designation based on its colonel's relative seniority. New Hampshire's three regiments of 1775 under Cols. James Reed, John Stark, and Enoch Poor, for example, became the 2d, 5th, and 8th Continental Regiments with only minor modifications. Promotions and some new appointments filled the officer ranks; the colony's support, such as exempting soldiers from the poll tax, helped recruiting.¹⁸

Rhode Island retained a quota of 1,500 men, organized into two instead of three regiments. Brig. Gen. Nathanael Greene, working closely with his brother Jacob (a member of the colony's Committee of Safety) and Governor Nicholas Cooke, used the reduction as an opportunity to purge the officer corps. James Varnum's and Daniel

17. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:202.
18. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:8, 633-46; 5th ser., 3:1035-38; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:202-7; William F. Goodwin, ed., "Journal of the congress of the Colony of New Hampshire," Historical Magazine, 2d ser., 4 (1868):147.

JAMES MITCHELL VARNUM (1748 - 89), a close friend of General Greene, raised a regiment in Rhode Island in 1775 and later commanded the Rhode Island Brigade and served in the Continental Congress. (Portrait by Charles Willson Peale.)

Hitchcock's regiments were retained as the 9th and 11th Continental Regiments. Thomas Church's was disbanded because Greene judged its officers poor disciplinarians; a handful of the latter, such as Maj. Henry Sherburne, were used to fill the two Continental regiments or were placed in units from other colonies.¹⁹

Connecticut had sent five regiments to Boston in 1775 and three to Canada. Since the colony's quota for 1776 was five regiments, the cadres at Boston were used to form the 10th, 17th, 19th, 20th, and 22d Continental Regiments. All had slightly modified geographical bases. Some sergeants became ensigns, and several other individuals, particularly veterans of the four companies that had been sent to Boston when their regiments went to Canada, received promotions to round out the officer complemented

Massachusetts had particular problems in making the transition. Washington assigned it a quota of 11,648 men, about 2,000 less than the colony had set for itself in 1775, to be divided into 16 regiments instead of the existing 27. Officers were selected On the basis of competence and in proportion to the number of men their 1775 regiments furnished. Where a regiment could be reorganized from an existing one, it was held together. In most cases, however, a single regiment could not furnish eight full companies; therefore, companies from several regiments were merged, with the field officer assignments reflecting the proportions from each. Massachusetts furnished the 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 23d, 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th Continental Regiments.

The reorganization involved New England's artillerymen as well as its infantry, combining Richard Gridley's regiment from Massachusetts and John Crane's Rhode Island company into a single regiment. On 17 November Congress named Henry Knox, a Boston bookseller whose volunteer service had impressed Washington, to re-

19. Rhode Island Historical Society Collections, 7 (1867):117-18; Greene, Papers, 1:124, 134-37, 14748, 154-65.
20. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:1110-11.

place Colonel Gridley as the artillery commander. After debate, Congress confirmed William Burbeck and John Mason as lieutenant colonels and Crane and John Lamb, commander of New York's artillery company, as majors. Burbeck and Mason had been Gridley's field officers in 1775. Congress ruled on 2 December that the regiment should consist of these five officers and twelve companies but left further organizational details to Washington and his advisers. (Chart 4) The regiment's staff was similar to that of an infantry regiment except that it included cadets undergoing on-the-job training. Each company contained 5 officers and 58 enlisted men. Eight noncommissioned officers, 8 bombardiers, 8 gunners, and 32 matrosses were allowed, but Knox followed a policy of filling those positions in proportion to the real strength of each company. Bombardiers, gunners, and matrosses were all privates, but the gunners and bombardiers were specialists who received higher pay.²¹

The Royal Artillery was technically a separate armed service, but Washington deliberately avoided this British precedent. The Royal Artillery consisted of a single regiment organized as four 8-company (increased in 1779 to four 10-company) battalions. In peacetime each company contained 5 officers and about 50 men; in wartime it expanded to 6 officers, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 9 bombardiers, 18 gunners, 2 drummers, and 73 matrosses. Both the battalion and the company were administrative

21. JCC, 3:359, 399; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:74, 120, 140-41, 158, 161, 460; 5:34-35; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:633-34; Artillery Returns for 1776, RG 93, National Archives. The separate company in the Hudson Highlands had the same organization except that it had sixty matrosses in deference to the added needs of detached duty: JCC, 3:309.

HENRY KNOX (1750-1806), the Boston bookseller who created the Continental Army's superlative artillery arm, succeeded Washington as the senior officer of the Army. He later became the first secretary of war. (Portrait by Charles Willson Peale, 1783.)

units. Tactical flexibility was provided by the use of provisional artillery "brigades" with crews for eight to ten guns.²²

Knox's companies were smaller than the British ones on a wartime footing, but their composition was more symmetrical. Like its British counterpart, the regiment was an administrative unit. Although he did not adopt the British "brigade" style, Knox distributed his companies in 1776 to man specific fortifications or batteries and had them camp with nearby infantry brigades. During the later stages of the campaign, detachments of one or two officers and crews for several guns were assigned to infantry brigades to furnish direct field artillery support. Shortages of trained artillerymen were a serious problem by summer. Knox prepared a plan to form a second regiment, and Congress approved it on 24 July. The events of the campaign, however, prevented any action to fill the regiment.²³

The Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment and the four associated Virginia and Maryland companies were not reorganized at the beginning of 1776 because their enlistment terms did not expire until 1 July 1776. The regiment, however, assumed a new designation to conform with those of the infantry regiments; in recognition of the fact that the riflemen were the first Continentals, the regiment was given primacy as the 1st Continental Regiment. Washington continued to employ it as a special reserve force. Two of its nine companies had been sent to Quebec, but attachment of the remaining Virginia company and the two Maryland companies enabled it to perform its mission. Washington and Congress began planning its reorganization in the spring of 1776,

22. Curtis, Organization of the British Army, pp. 6, 33-50; Horatio Rogers, ed., Hadden's Journal and Orderly Books (Albany: Joel Munsell's Sons, 1884), pp. 110, 154-59, 178-82, 216-20, 250-54; British Headquarters Papers, no. 5597 (Capt. John Stewart, "Disposition of Three Heavy Brigades of Field Brass Artillery," 13 Sep 82).
23. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 6:920-21; 5th ser., 1:502; 2:1096-97; 3:873; JCC, 5:606-7; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 5:38, 134-35, 322-24, 406-7.

and Congress ordered reenlistment for a two-year term on 17 June. Combat operations, however, slowed the reorganization.²⁴

The planning phase of the Main Army's reorganization in 1775 was short and smooth. Congress, Washington, and his senior officers agreed on both general policy and specifics, but a real crisis occurred when Washington started to reenlist the New Englanders on 13 November. Indeed, he became so upset by the slow progress that on 4 January 1776 he complained to Congress:

It is not in the pages of History perhaps to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket shot of the Enemy...and at the same time disband one Army and recruit another within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more than probably ever was attempted: But if we succeed as well in the latter, as we have hitherto in the former, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life.²⁵

New England's civil and military leaders had been very confident in October that their troops would rapidly reenlist, but by 30 December only 9, 649 men had signed up, an average of less than 1,400 a week. Another 2,808 enlisted by 3 February less than 600 a week during the first five weeks of the new year. The Commander in Chief urged the New England governments to institute a form of a draft to fill their regiments, and on 16 January Congress removed the restriction on reenlisting free Negroes. The extent to which unit commanders opened their ranks to this new source of recruits depended on their personal attitudes.²⁶

During the transition period, Washington filled the gaps in his lines with militiamen called up for limited periods by the New England colonies. New Hampshire and Massachusetts furnished about 4,000 men during late December 1775 when Washington anticipated that Connecticut's regiments might depart. On 16 January he called for full regiments of militia organized on the Continental pattern and for a longer period of service (until 1 April). New Hampshire had General Sullivan organize a regiment from companies already at Boston. Connecticut furnished four regiments, and Massachusetts provided six by calling on quotas from towns close to Boston.²⁷

Another crisis was the discovery in December that many firearms were not suited for sustained military use. Washington paraded the Connecticut units on 9 December, the day before their original enlistments expired, so that he could confiscate sound weapons from owners he feared would depart. He bombarded the New England governments with requests for any available arms, particularly British Brown Besses, and sent letters to Schuyler and Montgomery begging for captured materiel. This shortage, plus problems of ammunition supply, persisted during early 1776, but the crisis passed by the summer.²⁸

24. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:501-2; 5:109, 501; JCC, 4:188, 284; s 4s2; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:633-34; 5:1433; Greene, Papers, 1:336-38. On 31 August the regiment was provisionally grouped with elements of the Pennsylvania Flying camp to offset losses.
25. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:208.
26. Ibid., 4:172-74, 210-11, 227, 240-51; General Return Of the Troops of the Continental Army Inlisted upon the New Establishment, n.d., RG 93, National Archives; JCC, 4:60; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4: 193-95; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2:67; David o. White, Connecticut's Black Soldiers. 1775-1783 (Chester, cone.: Pequot Press, 1973).
27. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:189-91, 227-28, 246-51, 257-58; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:7, 221, 932-33, 1233-34, 1272-1312, 1410-68; 5:14-17; Sullivan, Letters and Papers, 1:129-34, 165-87.
28. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:150-53, 231, 235-39, 242, 246-51, 264, 325-27, 345-47. A 24 June 1776 return for 17 regiments at New York city (about 9,100 men) showed that 76 percent had arms rated good and that only 9 percent lacked arms. Shortages were concentrated in two regiments (1st and 3d New York Regiments) that had not yet completed organization and in one (20th Continental Regiment) whose colonel (Benedict Arnold) had never been present: Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 6:1121-22.

By March the regiments at Boston had passed through the period of greatest danger associated with the reorganization. Excluding artillery, Washington had 27 Continental regiments. They contained 828 officers, 694 sergeants, 365 drummers and fifers, and 12,510 rank and file. Militia reinforcements added 400 more officers and 6,500 enlisted men. The Main Army was roughly back to its 1775 strength in raw numbers. Just under 3,000 of the Continentals were sick at that time, although only 10 percent of these were hospitalized. Thirteen hundred more, including the entire 14th Continental Regiment, were on detached duties. All of the 25 reorganized infantry regiments on the siege lines were over half-strength. One had recruited over 90 percent of its rank and file goal, 10 others were at least three-quarters full, and only 5 were below 60 percent. In terms of real combat strength, half the regiments were over the 400-man level; only one was below 300. The regiments were not yet full, but they had made considerable progress.²⁹

Washington, however, had been profoundly disturbed by the reorganization. On 9 February he summarized his view for Congress:

To go into an enumeration of all the Evils we have experienced in this late great change of the Army...would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter....I shall with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion, that if the Congress have any reason to believe, there will be occasion for Troops another year. . . they would save money, and have infinitely better Troops if they were [to enlist men] for and during the war.... The trouble and perplexity of disbanding one Army and raising another at the same Instant, and in such a critical situation as the last was, is. . . such as no man, who has experienced it once, will ever undergo again.³⁰

The congressional committee sent to Cambridge in the fall of 1775 to discuss reorganization was instructed to deal with the troops in the Northern Department as well as those in eastern Massachusetts. With Washington's approbation, however, they limited their talks to the Main Army, realizing that the two field forces faced unique problems. In fact, Philip Schuyler's reorganization difficulties dwarfed Washington's. Rather than being concentrated in a small area, his troops faced a number of different situations. Congress sent a special committee to his headquarters to begin the reorganization, but events left the northern area in a state of flux until July 1776.

On 11 October 1775 Congress instructed Schuyler to encourage the Canadians to join the Revolution. It particularly stressed a guarantee of religious freedom for Roman Catholics, a major concession for American Protestants. Schuyler was even authorized to organize a Continental regiment from Canadians who were willing to join his army. He was also to confer with his senior officers and to determine how to raise the troops needed to defend Canada and the Lake Champlain forts during the coming winter. After receiving additional reports, Congress formed a committee to visit Schuyler. Three New Englanders were selected on 2 November: Robert Treat Paine,

29. General Return, Main Army, 2 Mar 76, RG 93, National Archives (also printed in Lesser, Sinews, pp. 17-18).
30. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:315-18. At this point in the war duration enlistments probably were not feasible.

John Langdon, and Eliphalet Dyer. When Dyer fell ill, New York's Robert R. Livingston, General Montgomery's brother-in-law, replaced him.³¹

Because the need for action was immediate, this committee's instructions included fairly broad powers. It took specific steps to encourage the Canadians to enlist and to solve logistical problems. Its primary purpose, however, was to collect data about the garrison needed for Canada and the forts in northern New York. It brought Schuyler information about the regimental organization and rates of pay that Congress had just approved, blank commissions for the Canadian regiment, and instructions to reenlist as many of the department's men as possible and to raise in New York or New England as many others as he might need to complete the conquest of Canada. The committee set out on 12 November and reached Ticonderoga on 28 November after inspecting the fortifications in the Hudson Highlands. It discovered that Schuyler and Montgomery, who had been promoted to major general on 9 December, had already begun the reorganization. The committee approved their actions, gathered information, and on 23 December submitted its report to Congress.³²

Congress acted on the report on 8 January 1776, before it learned of Montgomery's defeat at Quebec. The committee had accepted Schuyler's opinion that 3,000 men were needed for the winter; it recommended raising three regiments, including a Canadian regiment. Taking note of some of the negative aspects of the report, including the news that Seth Warner's and Timothy Bedel's men had gone home and that the other units had suffered heavy attrition, Congress approved an even larger garrison of nine regiments (about 6,500 men). Three were the units recommended by the committee: the regiment of Canadians and two regiments from Schuyler's veterans of 1775. They were to be reinforced by six new organizations. Congress requested New York, New Hampshire, and Connecticut each to raise a regiment for Canadian service. The remainder of the garrison was to come from regiments being formed in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. All nine would have the same structure as Washington's twenty-six reorganized infantry regiments.³³

The two veteran regiments were not formed until 15 April 1776. In November Montgomery had regrouped his forces for the drive on Montreal, keeping only those of his men who would extend their enlistments from December until mid-April. His New York regiments remained nominally intact, but he partially refilled the 1st Connecticut Regiment by disbanding the 4th and 5th Connecticut Regiments and transferring the personnel who extended. When the extended enlistments expired, the two new regiments came into being. As Washington had initially hoped to do, Schuyler wanted to mix officers from several colonies in each regiment. One was to have 5 companies from New York and 3 from Massachusetts, and the other was to have 4 from New Hampshire, 3 from Connecticut, and 1 from New York. General Wooster expressed what became the consensus that this scheme was impractical. Instead, one regiment was made up from New York veterans under Maj. John Nicholson of the old

31. JCC, 3:284-85, 298, 312, 317-18, 339; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2:161-63, 281; Burnett, Continental Congress, pp. 108-12.
32. JCC, 3:339-41, 350, 418, 446-52; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 2:326, 327n, 368, 377-79, 397-98, 407-8, 411-13.
33. JCC, 4:39-44. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3:60, 71-73, 77-79, 85-86, 88-89. See Chapter 4 below for background on the Pennsylvania and New Jersey units.

3d New York Regiment. Lt. Col. Samuel Elmore, who had been transferred from the old 4th to the old 1st Connecticut Regiment, commanded the other new Continental regiment, which was composed of Connecticut men and other New Englanders. Both regiments were assigned to light duty in the Mohawk Valley later in the year.³⁴

The organization of the other regiments in the north followed a slightly different course than Congress had planned. Schuyler had begun reorganizing the 2d New York Regiment, an Albany-based unit, as soon as he had learned of Montgomery's death, and he and its commander, Colonel Van Schaick, were able to assemble it swiftly at Albany as the regiment requested from New York.³⁵ Washington received Schuyler's report of the Quebec defeat on 18 January and immediately convened a Council of War. Without knowing of the 8 January congressional action, the council recommended diverting to Canada three planned militia regiments that had been allocated to reinforce Boston: one each from Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. Washington wrote to these colonies the next day, recommending that they raise the regiments not as short-term militia units but for a full year as Continentals. Congress accepted the first two as the regiments authorized on 8 January and later accepted the Massachusetts unit as well.³⁶

The three New England colonies recruited the regiments, as Washington had recommended, in areas close to Canada and filled them fairly rapidly. Connecticut formed its regiment in Litchfield County, which had a tradition of sending men to serve at Lake Champlain. A handful of officers were veterans of the old 4th Connecticut Regiment, but most, including Col. Charles Burrall, now entered Continental service for the first time. Capt. John Bigelow's company was equipped as artillery rather than infantry.³⁷ New Hampshire assembled its regiment at Coos (Haverhill) and marched it overland instead of waiting for the spring thaw to open Lake Champlain to water transport. Timothy Bedel became colonel in recognition for his ranger service. In May Maj. Isaac Butterfield ignominiously surrendered most of the regiment to an inferior force at The Cedars. He and Bedel were court-martialed for cowardice and banned from ever serving again, but Bedel successfully appealed and later served on the northern frontier.³⁸ Col. Elisha Porter, a popular western Massachusetts leader, filled that colony's regiment by using town quotas to raise five companies in Hampshire County and three in Berkshire County. Local politicians and the field officers selected the staff and company officers. This expedient hastened organization but created administrative difficulties.³⁹

34. JCC, 5:472, 615; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 5:362-63, 386-87; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:1216-19; 5:549-50; 5th ser., 1:1083, 1153; 2:857-58; Thomas Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950- ), ed. Julian P. Floyd, 1:436-47; Lt. Col. Rudolphus Ritzema to Col. Alexander McDougall, 19 Nov 75; McDougall Papers; Wooster to Congress, 10 Apr 76, Papers of the Continental Congress, RG 360, National Archives; Berthold Fernow, ed., New York in the Revolution, 2 vols. (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1887), 1:52, 74.
35. Schuyler to McDougall, 25 Jan 76, McDougall Papers; JCC, 4:43; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3:300301; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:1094; 5:294, 301, 312, 330-31, 1467-69.
36. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:254-61; JCC, 4:99-100.
37. Conn. Records, 15:225-27, 406-7; Force, American Archives, 5th ser., 3:1174-75.
38. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:302-3; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:14-18, 810-11; 5th ser., 1:16769, 747-48; Sullivan, Letters and Papers, 1:169-72, 271-77, General Gates to Bedel, 4 Mar 78, Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
39. Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:1270-75, 1298-99, 1404-8; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:324-25; General Ward to Congress, 3 Feb 76, RG 360, National Archives; Elisha Porter, "The Diary of Colonel Elisha Porter of Hadley, Massachusetts," ed. Appleton Morgan, Magazine of American History 30 (1893):185-206.

On 19 November 1775 Montgomery had directed his kinsman James Livingston to begin raising the regiment of Canadians authorized by Congress. Livingston, a New Yorker, had married a woman from Montreal and had settled at Chambly. He formed the regiment at nearby Pointe Olivier and moved it up to Quebec in December.⁴⁰

Several Canadians who had been expelled from Quebec by the British also began to recruit men, although only the partnership of Edward Antil and Moses Hazen proved successful. When Antil, son of a former chief justice of New Jersey, carried the news of Montgomery's death from Quebec to Congress, he used the opportunity to recommend Moses Hazen as a popular local leader. Hazen was a New Hampshire native who had served as a captain in Rogers' Rangers during the French and Indian War. Although he had been allowed to purchase a lieutenancy in the British 44th Foot, he had been forced into retirement in 1763 and had settled in Canada. After marrying a French-Canadian, he became an economic and social leader in the Richelieu Valley. Hazen arrived in Philadelphia shortly after Antil. On 20 January 1776 they secured authorization to raise a second Canadian regiment. Unlike Livingston's the new unit was patterned after French regiments in Europe during the Seven Years' War. Its 1,000 rank and file were organized in four battalions, each with five 50-man companies.⁴¹

Colonel Hazen and Lieutenant Colonel Antil returned to Canada and on 10 February organized the 2d Canadian Regiment, primarily in the Richelieu and St. Lawrence Valleys. Many French veterans of the French and Indian War who had remained as settlers in Canada in 1763 joined the unit, but only half the regiment was recruited before the pro-American sympathies of the Canadian populace subsided. Hazen's personal financial backing during this period gave the regiment a special status. Since Congress did not reimburse Hazen, it allowed him to retain a proprietary interest in the regiment. As a result the unit retained its unique four-battalion organization throughout the war.⁴²

Although both Canadian regiments drew heavily on French-Canadians for their enlisted strength, most of the officers came from the small English-speaking community. A majority of this segment of the population had been born in America, including the two colonels, and were ardent supporters of the Revolution. The influential French clergy, however, supported the British Crown. Bishop Briand of Quebec excommunicated Catholic Canadians who supported the Americans, including Francois-Louis Chartier de Lotbiniere, a Recollet priest who served as Livingston's chaplain. The evacuation of Canada in the summer of 1776 then added exile to this spiritual hardship for the men of the regiments and their families. Both regiments had to be

40. Montgomery to Schuyler, 19 Nov and 5 Dec 75, and Arnold to congress, 11 Jan 76, RG 360, National Archives.
41. Arnold to Congress, 12 Jan 76, RG 360, National Archives; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 5:550; JCC, 4:75, 78, 223, 238-39; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3:112-13, 122-24, 146-48, 154, 161, 167, 459. Valuable sources for the formation of the Canadian regiments include the following: George Francis Gilman Stanley, Canada Invaded, 1775-1776 (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973); Gustave Lanctot, Canada and the American Revolution, 1774-1783, trans. Margaret M. Cameron (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); and Allen S. Everest, Moses Hazen and the Canadian Refugees in the American Revolution (Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press, 1976).
42. JCC, 5:811-12; 6:900; 8:589; 19:427-29; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 5:751-53; Pennsylvania Archives, 1st ser., 8:17-20; Board of War Report, 28 Jun 81, RG 360, National Archives; Gates to (probably Congress), October 1778, and Hazen to Gates, 28 Jan 79 and 12 Dec 82, Gates Papers.

withdrawn from the front lines to reorganize—Livingston's in the Mohawk Valley and Hazen's at Albany.⁴³

Congress had reacted swiftly in January 1776 to news of the disaster at Quebec. In addition to officially adding the 2d Canadian Regiment and Colonel Porter's regiment to the Canadian garrison, it asked Washington to transfer one of his regiments and a general officer from Boston. On 17 January Congress clarified the command situation by transforming the invasion force into a separate territorial department. Since it believed that Schuyler did not want the Quebec assignment and that Wooster was "too infirm," Congress ordered Schuyler to shift his headquarters to New York City and instructed Charles Lee to go to Canada and to organize a department staff. Before Lee could set out, however, Congress reassigned him. On 6 March it then promoted John Thomas to major general as Lee's replacement; Thomas formally assumed command at Quebec on 2 May. Congress ordered Schuyler to remain at Albany and supervise logistical support for Canada in addition to his other duties.⁴⁴

During January Congress also considered the non-Canadian portion of the old New York Department. On the 19th of that month New York was again authorized to raise four regiments to defend itself. The colony's Provincial Congress allocated company quotas to the various counties on 15 February and submitted nominations for field officers to the Continental Congress in March. Three of the regiments were assembled from 1775 veterans. Alexander McDougall's 1st New York Regiment continued to be principally a New York City unit. Since Colonel Van Schaick had already reorganized the 2d for service in Canada, the old 3d and 4th were redesignated the 2d and 3d, respectively. James Clinton continued to command the former, drawn primarily from Ulster County and Long Island. Dutchess and Westchester Counties furnished the bulk of the 3d, while a new 4th was raised in Albany and other northern counties. Schuyler only gradually released the New York cadres remaining in Canada, a policy which retarded recruiting but which was a compromise with tactical considerations. The 1st assembled at New York, the 4th at Albany, and the 2d and 3d in the Hudson Highlands. Schuyler retained the 4th in northern New York, while the 2d assumed garrison responsibilities in the Highlands, and the 1st and 3d served at New York City.⁴⁵

Canada continued to attract Congress' attention. Knowing that the spring thaw would open the St. Lawrence River to the British, Congress and Washington ordered additional reinforcements to the north. Brig. Gen. William Thompson arrived in mid-May with the 8th (New Hampshire), 15th, 24th, and 25th (all Massachusetts) Continental Regiments, but they were immediately disabled by an outbreak of smallpox. Brig. Gen. John Sullivan reached St. John's on 31 May with a second force con-

43. JCC, 5:645; Force, American Archives, 5th ser., 1:797-800, 977, 1143-44, General Orders (After Orders), 21 Jul 76, Gates' Orderly Book, New-York Historical Society; Hazen to General Steuben, 11 and 24 Feb 80, Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
44. JCC, 4:70-71, 73, 99-100, 157-58, 186-87, 240-41; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3:108-9, 116-17, 122-27, 163-64, 267-71, 275-76, 282, 288-89, 310, 336-37, 341-42, 346-47, 350-51; Lee, Papers, 1:25153, 271-72, 343-44.
45. JCC, 4:69, 190, 238; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3:80, 100-102, 116-17, 121-24, 300-301, 346-47, 355-56, 381-83, 459; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 5:7-11; Sullivan and Flick, Minutes of the Albany Committee of Correspondence, 1:343-48; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:1081-82; 5:251-53, 267-80, 301, 314-18, 946-47, 968, 1439-40, 1467-69, 1498-99; Historical Magazine, 1st ser., Supplement 4 (1866), pp. 110-11.

PHILIP VAN CORTLANDT (1749-1803) was the son of New York's deputy governor and first joined the Army in 1775 as the lieutenant colonel of the 4th New York Regiment. He rose to the rank of colonel and served in Congress from 1793 to 1809. (Portrait attributed to James Sharples, Sr.)

sisting of the 2d and 5th (New Hampshire) Continental Regiments, the 2d New Jersey Regiment, and the 4th (less some elements) and 6th Pennsylvania Battalions. He found that Thomas himself had been stricken with smallpox on 21 May and had temporarily relinquished command to Thompson. When Thomas died on 2 June, Sullivan inherited command of the department.⁴⁶

The arrival of a British relief force under Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne, consisting of regulars from Britain, Brunswick, and Hesse-Hanau, forced the Continentals to abandon the siege of Quebec in early May 1776. After a slow withdrawal, the main body of Sullivan's troops arrived back at Crown Point on 1 July. American hopes of making Canada the fourteenth colony had ended in failure. The effort probably had been beyond the Continental Army's logistical capability; it certainly had ruined many regiments. A dispirited Sullivan complained that "I am Sufficiently mortified and Sincerely wish I had never seen this fatal country."⁴⁷

Congress had reacted to the deteriorating situation in Canada before Sullivan's withdrawal. A special diplomatic mission to Canada—delegates Benjamin Franklin and Samuel Chase and two leading Maryland Catholics, Charles and John Carroll—had conducted extensive discussions with American military leaders there in the late spring. Their report led to major command changes. On 17 June Congress appointed Horatio Gates as the new commanding general of "the Troops of the United Colonies in Canada" and endowed him with extensive emergency powers to reorganize the department staff and suspend incompetent officers. His selection was based both on his reputation as an organizer and administrator and on various political considerations reflecting the increased role of New England forces in a region initially considered

46. JCC, 4:236, 302; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 4:495-97, 500, 519-21, 526, 531; 5:15, 132-33; Sullivan, Letters and Papers, 1:212-14.
47. Sullivan, Letters and Papers, 1:242-43, 250-54, 271-77; Bush, Revolutionary Enigma: A Re-appraisal of Genera/ Philip Schuyler, pp. 56-62.

New York's responsibility. Gates arrived at Crown Point on 5 July and relieved Sullivan. Since Gates commanded a territorial department that no longer existed, on 8 July Congress ruled that he came under Schuyler's command.⁴⁸

Schuyler allowed Gates a large measure of autonomy by keeping his own headquarters at Albany and concentrating on logistics and affairs in the Mohawk Valley. Gates' "Northern Army" contained the majority of the department's combat troops and had the task of developing a fortress complex in the Ticonderoga area. Benedict Arnold and David Waterbury, who had commanded ships as civilians, commanded the Lake Champlain naval squadron. On 20 July Gates created a brigade structure for the units at Ticonderoga. Following the advice of his senior officers and relying on his own experience at Boston, he organized his four brigades by grouping units from the same or adjacent colonies to minimize friction. Arnold, the only brigadier general, commanded one brigade. The others were under three senior colonels: James Reed (replaced later by John Paterson), John Stark, and Arthur St. Clair.⁴⁹

Congress also formed two new units for the Northern Department from veterans of 1775. On 21 June 1776 it ordered New York to raise another regiment. Unlike earlier units, this regiment was enlisted for three years' service. Maj. Lewis Dubois of John Nicholson's regiment received the command, but disputes over the appointment of officers and seniority prevented the regiment from becoming fully operational. Congress authorized the second regiment, also for three years, on 5 July. Its cadre, Seth Warner's Green Mountain Boys, had begun reorganizing in early February. A shortage of cash limited Warner's recruiting until November.⁵⁰

Knox's Artillery Regiment was designed to support only the Main Army. Separate companies performed the same mission for Schuyler. The remnants of John Lamb's 1775 company voluntarily reenlisted under Lt. Isaiah Wool. They were reinforced in the spring by Ebenezer Stevens' and Benjamin Eustis' companies of Knox's regiment, Capt. John Bigelow's company (in Burrall's regiment), and a Pennsylvania company. That colony had misinterpreted a congressional resolution and had directed Bernard Romans, an engineer, to recruit an artillery company for service in Canada. Congress accepted it, however, and it marched north under Capt.-Lt. Gibbs Jones. New York also raised two new artillery companies in New York City, nominally in support of Schuyler. Sebastian Bauman's was a Continental unit created to garrison the fortifications in the Hudson Highlands. Alexander Hamilton's company of state troops spent most of 1776 under Knox's operational control, and on 17 March 1777 it formally transferred to the Continental Army.⁵¹

48. JCC, 4:151-52, 215-19, 233; 5:436, 448-53, 526; Burnett, Letters of Congress, 1:486-87; 2:16-17, 29-34; Fitzpatrick, Writings, 5:173-75, 547-51; Sullivan, Letters and Papers, 1:280-82. The political problems resulting from the appointment of Gates are discussed in Rossie, Politics of Command, pp. 97134, and Henderson, Party Politics in the Continental Congress, pp. 112-17.
49. Fitzpatrick, Writings, 5:222-24, 257; Gates, General Orders for 20 Jut and 11 Aug 76, Gates' Orderly Book; Gates to Hancock, 16 and 29 Jul and 6 Aug 76, and Colonel Hartley to Gates, 10 Jul 76, Gates Papers.
50. JCC, 4:177; 5:471-72, 479, 481, 518-19, 761; Burnett, Letters of Congress, 1:506-7, 510-13; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 4:588-89, 852-53, 1131; 5th ser., 1:717, 1390-99; Nathan Clark to Schuyler, 16 Jul 76, and Warner to Gates, 26 Apr 77, Gates Papers.

51. JCC, 3:309; 4:74, 99; Force, American Archives, 4th ser., 3:1289-90, 1315-16; 4:1026, 1058, 1068, 1567-69; 5:303, 316, 378, 389-90, 536, 730-32, 1416, 1436; 6:1336, 1339, 1412; 5th ser., 1:660-61, 1509; W. T. R. Saffell, Records of the Revolutionary War, 3d ed. (Baltimore: Charles E. Saffell, 1894), pp. 17881; Alexander Hamilton, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-), 1:187-88, 199-200.

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN (1706-90) became famous as a scientist, diplomat, philosopher, and politician. Me also sponsored the careers of two very important Continental Army generals: Anthony Wayne and Frederick von Steuben. (Portrait by Charles Willson Peale, 1772.)

The Northern Department finally stabilized during the pause in operations caused by the contest for naval control of Lake Champlain. In January 1776 Congress had planned a forward Canadian Department with nine regiments (6,500 men), supported by the Northern Department's four regiments (2,900 men) defending the area from New York City to Lake George. By August the Canadian Department no longer existed, and the Northern Department's responsibilities stopped just south of Albany. Its troops remained divided into two major groups: Gates' field army garrisoning the Ticonderoga complex and Schuyler's rear echelon sustaining communications and controlling the Mohawk Valley.⁵²

Gates commanded a force, exclusive of artillery, of fifteen Continental infantry regiments and one separate rifle company, plus six regiments of militia. It contained 386 officers, 333 sergeants, 143 drummers and fifers, and 6,262 rank and file, a total roughly equivalent to the number Congress originally had intended for Canada. True combat strength was about 4,000 continentals, including the detachment manning the fleet on Lakes Champlain and George, because nearly 2,200 were sick, another 1,000 were on detached duties, and 185 were on furlough. Only three of the Continental regiments were over three-quarters full even on paper, and ten were between half and two-thirds complete. This shortage significantly reduced their effectiveness in open battle, but it was less of a problem in garrison. The militia added about 200 officers and over 3,500 enlisted men, most of whom were still fit.

In terms of the division of forces in the north, Gates had the six strongest regiments of those originally assigned to the Canadian garrison or added by Congress in January 1776. He also had the four regiments sent north under Thompson and five of the six that had accompanied Sullivan. Schuyler retained the four regiments which had served longest in Canada and which consequently were in the worst shape. He

52. General Return, Northern Department, 24 Aug 76, Gates Papers. This return contains complete data only for the units directly under Gates.

SECOND EMBARKATION

also had the two regiments raised by New York in the Albany region (Van Schaick's and the 4th New York Regiment), the 3d New Jersey Regiment from Sullivan's force, and the two new regiments just beginning their organization. Three militia regiments supplemented his troops. Schuyler had only three Continental regiments that were even reasonably effective. They certainly contained less than the 3,000 effectives he had originally been promised, but they were sufficient for his reduced defensive responsibilities.

Congress and the Continental Army's leaders worked closely together during the autumn of 1775 to prepare for the coming year. They hoped to eliminate problems revealed during the preceding months and to make the transition smooth. The cornerstone of the effort was Congress' approval of a standard infantry regiment designed by Washington and his generals to be a very powerful force with a streamlined organization. Unlike the British Army, which had been heavily influenced by the Seven Years' War in Europe, the Continental Army reflected Anglo-American experiences in the French and Indian War. The standard regiment's high ratio of officers to enlisted men recognized the greater need for control under American conditions than under European. The organization and use of the two-rank battle formation emphasized American faith in musketry rather than shock action.

Adoption of the standard regiment solved one problem revealed during 1775, but reorganization raised new difficulties. Both Washington and Schuyler hoped to emphasize national identification by mingling personnel from several colonies in each regiment. Opposition from officers and men alike ended that concept. A far greater source of trouble was that regiments in 1776 fell short of their authorized strength. Few regiments ever reached their legal maximum size, and many took a long time to achieve minimum efficiency.

Washington's Main Army at Boston was able to survive the crisis created by slow enlistments by calling on a sizable militia contingent. Slow but steady recruiting raised his army by March to a level where it could begin to apply pressure on General Howe in Boston. British evacuation of the town on 17 March gave the Commander in Chief his first victory. By contrast, defeat marked the American military effort in Canada during the first half of 1776. Reinforcements of continentals were dispatched several times, but Governor Carleton's British and German regulars still drove the field army of the Canadian Department all the way back to Ticonderoga. In addition, many of the units sent north were badly weakened by attrition and disease. The main focus of events now shifted back to the Main Army.